Article

 

Institutional and organisational dynamics in the post – socialist transformation (p.17-25)

by

Eric Magnin, GERME, University Paris 7 and CEMI, EHESS

Xavier Richet, CIEH, University La Sorbonne Nouvelle (Paris)

Yorgos Rizopoulos, CRIISEA, University of Picardie

 

 

Evolution and institutions : a cognitive perspective (p.27-45)

by

Brian J. Loasby, Department of Economics, University of Stirling (Stirling, Scotland)

Keywords : Uncertainty, Cognition, Structure, Connections, Knowledge

JEL classification : B52, D83, L22, O12

Abstract

Evolution, institutions, and organisation in economic systems rest on uncertainty and the characteristics of human cognition. All processes require structure, which influences their outcomes; every structure is a pattern of selected relationships. Cognition depends on neural connections, which are genetically derived, but not determined; institutions provide frameworks; and organizations provide routines and decision premises. Responses to uncertainty include conservatism, the adoption of other people’s rules, and experimentation; diversity extends the range of both defensive and imaginative practices on which selection can work; and the division of labour promotes diversity. Successful change requires ‘good continuity’ – a problem for transition economies.

 

 

Why national trajectories of post-socialist transformation differ ? (p.47-65)

by

Bernard Chavance, GERME, Université Paris 7 and CEMI, EHESS

Keywords : transition doctrine, evolutionary theories, transition surprises, formal and informal rules, convergence vs diversity

JEL classification : B2, H0, N0, P5

Abstract

The paper tries to assess the answers to the great challenge of post-socialism, by concentrating on the transition doctrine and on the institutionalist and evolutionary views. « Economics of transition » were a kind of convergence theory, that was soon criticised by institutionalist and evolutionary theories. The latter have appeared more accurate confronted to the real and complex experience of transformation in various countries. Consequently a qualified transition doctrine was developed in the second half of the 1990. Evolutionary and institutionalist theories have however insufficiently analysed two related problems in the process of systemic change: real discontinuities in various configurations of rules (the "revolutionary" dimension of transformation) and the path-shaping consequences of futurity for various actors, faced with a unique systemic uncertainty, especially in the early period. The paper considers the problem of diversity vs convergence in transformation theories. The country differences have been strongly influenced by national features of the process of organisational, institutional and systemic change. The basis of variety in the national trajectories of post-socialist transformation lies in the enduring national character of the state, of the polity with its underlying social relations and compromises, and of the legislation (formal institutional rules). Legitimacy remains principally formed and sustained - or questioned - on the national level. Even though the 1990s have been a decade of intensive « globalisation », and the role of external forces has been great indeed on the new emerging capitalisms of the region, the development of the latter has retained a fundamentally national basis.

 

 

Path – dependence and initial conditions in the transition processc : the cases of Hungary and Romania (p.67-87)

by

Eric Magnin, GERME, University Paris 7 and CEMI, EHESS

Keywords : Transition, Path dependence, Institutions, EU integration, Hungary, Romania

JEL classification : P2, P52, O49, B25

Abstract

Thirteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, initial conditions in 1989-1990, especially the institutional legacy, appear to have been of crucial importance in the determination of ‘vicious’ or ‘virtuous’ national transition trajectories throughout the nineties. To illustrate both cases, the Hungarian and the Romanian paths of transformation are briefly analyzed. Hence this paper discusses the issue of path dependence and initial conditions in transitology and economics, as far as institutional and organizational change are concerned.

 

 

The impact of institutional change on organisational practices in romanian agriculture : the case of Alba, Transylvania (p.89-107)

by

Françoise Simon, Ecole Nationale Supérieure d’Agronomie de Montpellier, UMR MOISA

Jean-Philippe Colin, Ecole Nationale Supérieure d’Agronomie de Montpellier, UMR MOISA, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement

Laurence Amblard, Ecole Nationale Supérieure d’Agronomie de Montpellier, UMR MOISA

Keywords : Romania, institutional change, land reform, agrarian contracts, property rights, farming organizations

JEL classification : P20, P32, Q12, Q15

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to present the consequences of the changes in the class=Section2> institutional environment on organizational and contractual practices in Romanian agriculture. It focuses mainly on the consequences of the redistribution and restitution of land previously managed by the agricultural cooperatives. The results, here exposed, are based on a field research conducted in summer 2001 in Transylvania. Our fist observation is the current diversity in organizational and contractual practices, which are explained by some key elements such as resource endowments and constraints linked to the implementation of institutional change. We will go on to show that previous organizational choices made just after the restitution, due to an organizational path dependency, have constrained the current choices.

 

 

Informal tax competition on a regional level : the russian scenario (p.109-121)

by

Andrei Yakovlev, Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, State University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)

Keywords : Russian economy, tax evasion, tax competition

JEL classification : D21, H26, O17

Abstract

One major problem of the Russian economy is large-scale tax evasion. Using standard assumptions of tax competition theory it is possible to show that under certain conditions it is not profitable for regional governments to suppress tax evasion. Indeed, the decrease of regional tax rate can lead to a decrease of subsidies and financial transfers from central government. Therefore a better instrument for the region to attract a taxpayer is the change of informal tax regime. Taxpayers are informally allowed not to pay a part of regional and federal taxes and regional governments have not to choose between high or low tax rates, but whether to suppress or to ignore tax evasion. Thus weakness of the federal government enforces opportunistic behavior of the regional governments and eventually leads to tremendous losses primarily for the federal budget. Moreover, massive tax evasion occurs even without corruption of taxation authorities or regional governments.